syria. Although the U.S.-Syrian relationship is at a low point,
both countries have important interests in the region that could
be enhanced if they were able to establish some common
ground on how to move forward. This approach worked effectively
in the early 1990s. In this context, Syria’s national interests
in the Arab-Israeli dispute are important and can be brought
into play.
Syria can make a major contribution to Iraq’s stability in
several ways. Accordingly, the Study Group recommends the
following:

RECOMMENDATION 12: The United States and the Support
Group should encourage and persuade Syria of the
merit of such contributions as the following:
• Syria can control its border with Iraq to the maximum extent
possible and work together with Iraqis on joint patrols
on the border. Doing so will help stem the flow of
funding, insurgents, and terrorists in and out of Iraq.
• Syria can establish hotlines to exchange information with
the Iraqis.
• Syria can increase its political and economic cooperation
with Iraq.
4. The Wider Regional Context
The United States will not be able to achieve its goals in the
Middle East unless the United States deals directly with the
Arab-Israeli conflict.
There must be a renewed and sustained commitment by
the United States to a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace on all
fronts: Lebanon, Syria, and President Bush’s June 2002 commitment
to a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine. This
commitment must include direct talks with, by, and between
Israel, Lebanon, Palestinians (those who accept Israel’s right to
exist), and particularly Syria—which is the principal transit
point for shipments of weapons to Hezbollah, and which supports
radical Palestinian groups.
The United States does its ally Israel no favors in avoiding
direct involvement to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict. For several
reasons, we should act boldly:

There is no military solution to this conflict.
• The vast majority of the Israeli body politic is tired of being a
nation perpetually at war.
• No American administration—Democratic or Republican—
will ever abandon Israel.
• Political engagement and dialogue are essential in the Arab-
Israeli dispute because it is an axiom that when the political
process breaks down there will be violence on the ground.
• The only basis on which peace can be achieved is that set
forth in UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and
in the principle of “land for peace.”
• The only lasting and secure peace will be a negotiated peace
such as Israel has achieved with Egypt and Jordan.
This effort would strongly support moderate Arab governments
in the region, especially the democratically elected
government of Lebanon, and the Palestinian Authority under
President Mahmoud Abbas.
RECOMMENDATION 13: There must be a renewed and
sustained commitment by the United States to a comprehensive
Arab-Israeli peace on all fronts: Lebanon and Syria, and
President Bush’s June 2002 commitment to a two-state solution
for Israel and Palestine.
RECOMMENDATION 14: This effort should include—as
soon as possible—the unconditional calling and holding of

meetings, under the auspices of the United States or the
Quartet (i.e., the United States, Russia, European Union, and
the United Nations), between Israel and Lebanon and Syria
on the one hand, and Israel and Palestinians (who acknowledge
Israel’s right to exist) on the other. The purpose of these
meetings would be to negotiate peace as was done at the
Madrid Conference in 1991, and on two separate tracks—
one Syrian/Lebanese, and the other Palestinian.
RECOMMENDATION 15: Concerning Syria, some elements
of that negotiated peace should be:
• Syria’s full adherence to UN Security Council Resolution
1701 of August 2006, which provides the framework for
Lebanon to regain sovereign control over its territory.
• Syria’s full cooperation with all investigations into political
assassinations in Lebanon, especially those of Rafik
Hariri and Pierre Gemayel.
• A verifiable cessation of Syrian aid to Hezbollah and the use
of Syrian territory for transshipment of Iranian weapons
and aid to Hezbollah. (This step would do much to solve Israel’s
problem with Hezbollah.)
• Syria’s use of its influence with Hamas and Hezbollah
for the release of the captured Israeli Defense Force
soldiers.
• A verifiable cessation of Syrian efforts to undermine the
democratically elected government of Lebanon.

A verifiable cessation of arms shipments from or transiting
through Syria for Hamas and other radical Palestinian
groups.
• A Syrian commitment to help obtain from Hamas an acknowledgment
of Israel’s right to exist.
• Greater Syrian efforts to seal its border with Iraq.
RECOMMENDATION 16: In exchange for these actions and
in the context of a full and secure peace agreement, the Israelis
should return the Golan Heights, with a U.S. security guarantee
for Israel that could include an international force on the
border, including U.S. troops if requested by both parties.
RECOMMENDATION 17: Concerning the Palestinian issue,
elements of that negotiated peace should include:
• Adherence to UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and
338 and to the principle of land for peace, which are the
only bases for achieving peace.
• Strong support for Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas
and the Palestinian Authority to take the lead in preparing
the way for negotiations with Israel.
• A major effort to move from the current hostilities by consolidating
the cease-fire reached between the Palestinians
and the Israelis in November 2006.
• Support for a Palestinian national unity government.

Sustainable negotiations leading to a final peace settlement
along the lines of President Bush’s two-state solution, which
would address the key final status issues of borders, settlements,
Jerusalem, the right of return, and the end of conflict.