Ashkenazi to annul Halutz's organizational changes to IDF By Ze'ev Schiff

Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi is planning to do away with a significant portion of the extensive reorganization programs that the Israel Defense Forces carried out during 2005. When he was Defense Ministry director general, Ashkenazi did not support the reorganization program and his view on the matter was only reinforced following the second Lebanon war.

A report prepared by Major General (res.) Herzl Sapir on the reorganization plans and their negative effect on the conduct of the war is highly critical of the process. The Sapir committee was appointed under the previous chief of staff, Dan Halutz.

The following are its main recommendations:

*Corps headquarters will be restored - commanding a number of divisions of ground forces; these were discarded as part of the reorganization. During the Lebanon war. This proved to have been a mistake, and it is expected that Ashkenazi will resume their operation.

*The Logistics Command, which underwent radical changes, will be restored; Ashkenazi will reverse decisions that led to the cancellation of professional specialization units.

*Fundamental decisions made in connection with the Ground Forces Command will be reexamined; as part of the reorganization, the Ground Forces Command was greatly expanded and became unwieldy.

Largest reorganization in history

During the first half of 2005, the largest reorganization plan in the history of the IDF went into effect. The organizational changes were extensive, and affected the overall concept of the way the IDF operates. The focus was on strengthening commands, the Operations Directorate and the Ground Forces Command, at the expense of the Corps Command structure.

The Sapir committee was assigned the task of evaluating the changes undergone by IDF as part of the reorganization, and the way these affected the war's conduct.

In the past, Sapir served as deputy chief of staff and national police chief. As a civilian he managed various companies, and prepared a variety of development and reorganization programs, including those for the Home Front Command and the Israel Emergency Economic Authority.

The report on the reorganization and its effects was sent to the Winograd Committee, appointed to investigate the war in Lebanon, as well as the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee.

Experts are convinced that the investigation by the Sapir-led team is one of the most professional of the dozens of in-house probes carried out by the IDF since the war.

Sapir writes in the report that "the changes [to the IDF] were carried out without orderly staff work. The question is whether the chief of staff is authorized to decide to make such changes on his own, without the issue being raised and examined by the government with the assistance of additional parties."

According to Sapir, the reorganization "caused a terrible distortion" and led to great waste, such as the creation of a Ground Forces Command that includes two major generals and 15 brigadier generals.

Sapir also complains that "commanders were given charge of divisions without undergoing the necessary professional training and preparation," and had undergone training in low-intensity warfare as preparation for routine security work, at the expense of training for high-intensity fighting. Armored units had not touched their tanks for a year.

Another "distortion" is the fact that the Operations Directorate and Military Intelligence were used as commands, allowing them to direct air and naval forces. This was done despite the fact that the Operations Directorate is a General Staff unit and like MI does not normally deploy or command forces.

Sapir is also critical of the general assessment in the IDF that Israel would not face a major war in the foreseeable future, and that therefore it was possible to carry out a reorganization. This resulted in no major exercises by ground forces for considerable periods of time.

The fighting in the territories also affected the structure of the army and division-sized units were downgraded, which contributed to the attitude that the war in Lebanon was merely a local operation.

One of the immediate results was a failure to call up reservists during the early part of the war.

Logistics 'bordering on the irresponsible'

Sapir is also critical of logistics, which in some cases "bordered on the irresponsible." This was true not only in matters of ammunition but also with regard to essentials such as water, food and fuel, as well as the evacuation of the injured and the rescue of immobilized vehicles.

In his report, Sapir states that the number of positions in the General Staff has become bloated. Comparing it to 15 years ago, Sapir says that there has been an increase in the number of sections in the General Staff, in brigades and departments, with dozens of officers of various rank being added.

He says that this was done in spite of the questionable need on the part of the General Staff, in view of its current missions.

Sapir is highly critical of the fact that "the war began at our initiative and we did not take advantage of the benefits granted to the initiator." He says that the war was conducted with a lack of either an overall vision or an authorized operational plan. The General Staff intervened in tactical orders and the orders issued were in part vague and difficult to understand.

Regarding the appointment of the first chief of staff who was not from the ground forces (Halutz came from the air force), Sapir quotes what he told former air force chief Ezer Weizman, when the latter asked him what his chances were of becoming chief of staff: "Under the circumstances in which the State of Israel exists, one who has not commanded a division, who has not served as sector commander, and did not serve in two posts with the rank of major general in the General Staff, cannot be a chief of staff. It is not a personal problem. You can be a defense minister and maybe even prime minister, but not chief of staff. My view has not changed," Sapir said.

Good Job, Gabi