Monday, December 17, 2007

U.S. JCS Chief Tries To Calm Israelis Over Iran
By BARBARA OPALL-ROME 12/17/07 19:21
www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=3249119&C=mideast

TEL AVIV - Unlike the United States, whose global interests and large
budgets allow for forces tailored to symmetric as well as asymmetric
warfare, Israeli planners say their future force must be dictated by demands
of conventional combat, and only then adapted for lower-intensity scenarios.

In a brief visit here by U.S. Navy Adm. Michael Mullen, the first by a
chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in a decade, Israeli
officials discussed not only the differences driving U.S. and Israeli force
planning, but conflicting conclusions by their respective intelligence
communities regarding Iran's nuclear weapon program.

They also discussed the many similarities in the way both militaries view
the global terror threat, the destabilizing effect of radical Islam, and the
need to check Iranian and Syrian adventurism in the region, sources from
both countries said.

Hosted by Lt. Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi, Israel's top-ranking military officer,
Mullen's Dec. 9-10 stop here following a conference in Bahrain provided a
rare opportunity for detailed, back-to-back briefings by most IDF General
Staff members.

U.S. officials insisted the trip was not aimed at controlling damage from
the controversial National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), but Mullen's visit
allowed officials to vent frustrations over findings that Tehran had
suspended its nuclear weapon program and was now less intent on acquiring
atomic arms.

In a Dec. 11 interview, an Israeli official conceded that presentations by
Maj. Gen. Amos Yadlin, director of military intelligence, contained no new
data or supporting evidence that had not already been shared with U.S.
allies. Nevertheless, he said, the briefing provided a thorough
chronological accounting and methodological explanation of how Israeli
analysts arrived at conclusions that ran counter to the NIE, released Dec.
3.

According to the official, Mullen repeatedly tried to assuage Israeli angst
over the damage the downgraded U.S. threat estimate would inflict on efforts
to rally international opposition to Iran's uranium enrichment program.

"The chairman insisted he still viewed Iran as a significant threat to the
region, and that was nice. But so what? The damage from the NIE is already
done," he said.

A JCS spokesman, Capt. John Kirby, confirmed that Mullen "remains concerned
about the continued threat by Iran's actions, words and intentions in the
region."

The JCS spokesman added that Mullen views Israel as a close and important
ally and that during his visit, both sides pledged to strengthen
military-to-military ties through continued dialogue, joint exercises,
intelligence sharing and other forms of strategic cooperation.

Building Forces for Full-Scale War

In a sanitized account of his discussions with Mullen, Ashkenazi cited the
Iranian nuclear threat and other negative developments in the region that
may compel the IDF to wage simultaneous symmetric and asymmetric combat on
multiple fronts. At the same time, the IDF must defend the Israeli home
front from increasingly lethal and long-range rocket and missile attacks, he
said.

Addressing participants at a Dec. 12 conference by Tel Aviv University's
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), Ashkenazi said the IDF is
reorganizing and re-equipping itself to deliver rapid, decisive victory.

"The basis for this will be determined by our ability to be decisive in
symmetric engagements," he said. "By preparing to win conventional wars, the
IDF will acquire decisive capabilities also for asymmetrical engagements,
and not vice versa.

At the same time, Ashkenazi said, the IDF knows how to build small numbers
of smart, special units - such as undercover commandos operating in the West
Bank - with the "unique knowledge and all the special tools in the toolbox
that they require."

He also cautioned that asymmetrical tactics, operating concepts and force
structure differs in each of IDF's geographic theaters. "Not every
asymmetric war
is the same. There are differences in how we fight in Gaza, against
Hizbollah in Lebanon and in the West Bank, and the key is to know how to
distinguish among the differences and exploit them."

But Ashkenazi insisted that one thing remains common to all of the IDF's
asymmetric war-fighting scenarios: "We'll always need a physical presence,
both for intelligence and for operative control. We cannot rely on firepower
to be decisive in asymmetric war."

In a direct reference to Iran, Ashkenazi said the coming years will require
the IDF to strengthen its "long-arm" attack capabilities andearly warning,
intelligence and networked command-and-control systems.

"It's up to the international community to act in a determined way to stop
Iran's nuclearization," he said. "But at the same time, we have the
responsibility to prepare for any scenario in the event that international
efforts do not succeed."

As for Syria, Ashkenazi made what many here interpreted as an indirect
reference to Israel's Sept. 6 attack on a suspected unconventional weapon
site when he spoke of the need for "direct attack on threats to our home
front, in parallel to ... exploiting their points of vulnerability."

Syria embodies elements of symmetric and asymmetric warfare, the IDF chief
said: "We need to know where we have the relative advantage ... and to act
accordingly."

With regard to Syria's support of Hizbollah and Hamas, Ashkenazi said, "We're
not going to act as we have in the past. We will no longer allow the other
side to claim victory simply by not losing."

He said the IDF's post-Lebanon war strategy involves not only physical
attacks on Syria, but other means of affecting Damascus' desire to arm,
train and protect proxy forces fighting Israel.